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The Second American Revolution in the Separation 
of Powers 
David Fontana* 
The American Constitution creates three branches of government and 
ensures that there will be sufficiently great amounts of ideological diversity 
among these branches of government.  Despite this regime ensuring external 
heterogeneity, the American system, uniquely among the world’s major con-
stitutional democracies, rarely creates the same degree of heterogeneity at 
the highest levels of the Executive Branch that it does among the highest lev-
els of the various branches of government.  This Article discusses the 
distinctiveness of the homogeneous high-level American Executive Branch 
and the events that led to such a situation.  At the first key moment defining 
the separation of powers in the new American Constitution, the time of the 
creation of the Constitution, there was still support for an Executive Branch 
composed of a diverse range of leaders, and the rules of the new Constitution 
did not hinder this ambition.  At the second key moment defining the separa-
tion of powers in the new Constitution, the creation of the Twelfth 
Amendment in 1804, a series of new rules and the political and legal realities 
that followed resulted in the highest levels of the Executive Branch becoming 
far more homogeneous than the one that preceded the Twelfth Amendment. 
I. Introduction 
When Democratic President Barack Obama ran for the presidency in 
2008, he promised to appoint members of both political parties to his cabinet 
if he became President.1  After his election, President Obama retained 
Republican President George W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates,2 appointed as his Secretary of Transportation former Republican 
member of the House of Representatives Ray LaHood,3 and tried 
(unsuccessfully) to appoint as his Secretary of Commerce Republican 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  My thanks go to 
Sanford Levinson and the editors of the Texas Law Review for inviting me to present at their 
symposium on constitutional design.  For comments, my thanks to Richard Hyland, Johanna Kalb, 
Chip Lupu, Mike Seidman, and Peter Smith. 
1. See, e.g., Sarah Baxter, Barnstorming Obama Plans to Pick Republicans for Cabinet, TIMES  
(London), Mar. 2, 2008, at 22 (“Obama is hoping to appoint cross-party figures to his cabinet such 
as Chuck Hagel, the Republican senator for Nebraska and an opponent of the Iraq war, and Richard 
Lugar, leader of the Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.”). 
2. Peter Baker & Thom Shanker, Obama Planning to Retain Gates as Defense Chief, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, at A1. 
3. Matthew L. Wald, Panel Approves Transportation Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at 
A22. 
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Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire.4  Obama’s decision to retain 
Secretary Gates and to appoint Secretary LaHood means that Republicans5 
will be overseeing two of the major areas of policy activity for the Obama 
Administration: Secretary Gates will oversee the withdrawal of American 
forces from Iraq and the intensification of American efforts in Afghanistan,6 
and Secretary LaHood will oversee the billions of dollars of infrastructure 
spending that are part of President Obama’s stimulus package.7  The current 
situation—in which two members of the party that lost the last election for 
President hold high-ranking executive office—is rare in the United States, 
even though it is common at the highest levels of most of the world’s other 
major constitutional democracies.8 
Why is this so?  Why are the central players (who are the focus of this 
Article, rather than the entire Executive Branch) in the American Executive 
Branch so homogeneous, in terms of partisanship and therefore also usually 
in terms of ideological positions?  There are many kinds of explanations for 
this homogeneity.  Part of it may have to do with the way we view elections 
and our desire to give the party that wins elections control of the branch that 
they won.  Part of it may have to do with our distinctively political rather 
than bureaucratic idea of executing the laws. 
But part of the explanation of the internally homogeneous American 
Executive Branch is historical and has to do with a centrally important—but 
generally misunderstood and ignored—constitutional transformation: the 
transformation that followed the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment in 
1804.  After the American presidential election of 1800, in which a close 
election resulted in the House of Representatives choosing Thomas Jefferson 
as President and the Senate choosing Aaron Burr as his Vice President,9 the 
Twelfth Amendment was added to the Constitution to change the rules used 
to select the President and Vice President of the United States.  Before the 
Twelfth Amendment, electors cast ballots for two individuals, without 
identifying which particular office they wanted those individuals to hold, and 
 
4. Jeff Zeleny, 2nd Pick to Run Commerce Dept. Withdraws Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at 
A1. 
5. While both Secretary Gates and Secretary LaHood are Republicans, Secretary LaHood 
probably counts as more of a Republican because he has been elected for office as a Republican.  
See, e.g., Wald, supra note 3 (“Mr. LaHood [is] a Republican former congressman from 
Illinois . . . .”).  Secretary Gates has long worked for Republicans, but he is not a registered 
Republican.  See Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (CNN television broadcast Nov. 9, 2008), available 
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0811/09/le.01.html (transcribing an interview with 
Senator Reid in which he explains that Secretary Gates has “never been a registered Republican”). 
6. See Peter Baker, In Announcing Withdrawal Plan, Obama Marks Beginning of Iraq War’s 
End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2009, at A6 (discussing President Obama’s plan to withdraw troops from 
Iraq and shift resources to Afghanistan). 
7. Wald, supra note 3. 
8. See infra section II(B)(2). 
9. For a discussion of the political and constitutional controversy surrounding this, see generally 
Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 551 (2004). 
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the person finishing in second place nationally (if they had a certain mini-
mum number of electoral votes) became Vice President.10  The Twelfth 
Amendment required electors casting ballots for these national offices to 
separately designate their choice for President and their choice for Vice 
President.11  We study the separation of powers regime created by the origi-
nal Constitution in 1787 for what it did to separate power among the 
branches of government.  But the separation of powers regime that resulted 
when the Twelfth Amendment was created—and the series of political and 
legal changes that followed it—was another revolution in the American sepa-
ration of powers, this one with major implications for the “internal separation 
of powers.”12  In general, though, as Sanford Levinson and Ernest Young 
have noted, “[t]he Twelfth Amendment is a Rodney Dangerfield of the 
Constitution: it gets no respect.  Indeed, it gets little discernible attention at 
all.”13  Steven Calabresi perhaps summarizes the conventional wisdom about 
the Twelfth Amendment the best when he writes that “[t]he Twelfth 
Amendment was a relatively nontransformative amendment because it made 
one small technical change.”14 
Part II of this Article explores the dynamics that lead to diverse high-
level executive branches in most of the world’s major constitutional 
democracies and a substantially less diverse high-level Executive Branch in 
the United States.  Part III discusses the Founding Era and finds that those 
involved in the creation of the Constitution in 1787 did not mean to create 
this form of homogeneity within the Executive Branch.  Part IV then turns to 
a discussion of how the creation of the Twelfth Amendment resulted in a 
change in the composition of the highest levels of the Executive Branch. 
 
10. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
11. Id. amend. XII. 
12. See Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319–22 (2006) (explaining the need for internal checks 
within each branch of government). 
13. Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 925, 925 (2001). 
14. Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A Reply 
to Professor Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 475 (2006) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE 
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DEMOCRACY (2005)).  Bruce Ackerman discusses the changes in understandings about the 
Executive Branch following the election of 1800, but more in terms of how the presidency was 
understood and not how the Executive Branch in general would operate.  See BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 143–44 (2005) (“The presidential office also lacked the plebiscitarian 
symbolism it has since acquired . . . .  This rhetorical development was only at its beginning in 
1800.”). 
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II. The External Heterogeneity and Internal Homogeneity of American 
Separation of Powers 
A. External Heterogeneity 
As a large, sprawling, and diverse country, it would be surprising not to 
find a range of partisan and ideological perspectives in the American federal 
government, and the constitutional system that was created in 1787 ensures 
that a variety of viewpoints do often manifest themselves in important posi-
tions of the American federal government.  The manner in which we elect 
our leaders—and the breadth of the powers these leaders exercise—
substantially increases the possibility of creating a range of perspectives 
between the branches of government. 
A major reason for this external diversity has to do with the rules 
governing elections to the federal government.  For one thing, those holding 
the top elected positions in the federal government are elected at different 
times.15  Members of the House of Representatives are elected every two 
years.16  The President of the United States is elected every four years.17  
Members of the Senate are elected every six years.18  Because they are 
elected at different times, the members of the different branches of govern-
ment will represent different national and regional moods.  American voters 
cared much more about the economy during the presidential election of 2008, 
for instance, than they did during the congressional elections of 2002.19  The 
much more pro-war electorate in 2002 was quite different than the more anti-
 
15. Steven Calabresi has written that the difference in timing for these elections is one of the 
defining virtues of the American regime of separation of powers.  See Steven Calabresi, Why 
Professor Ackerman Is Wrong to Prefer the German to the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. 
COMMENT. 51, 57 (2001) (“Our Madisonian system of staggered elections every two years for the 
House of Representatives, every four years for the presidency, and every six years for one third of 
the Senate is a much more sophisticated way of sampling the popular will than that offered by the 
German system.  It gauges and recalibrates not only the geographical spread of particular 
viewpoints but also the intensity with which opinions are held.”). 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
17. Id. art. II, § 1. 
18. Id. art. I, § 3. 
19. Even before the financial crisis hit in September of 2008, polls indicated that Americans 
cared the most about a candidate who was good on economic issues.  See, e.g., LYMARI MORALES, 
GALLUP, AMERICANS PRIORITIZE THE ECONOMY OVER TERRORISM: MAJORITY VIEWPOINT 
PERSISTS ACROSS ALL INCOMES AND AMONG INDEPENDENTS (2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 
108415/Americans-Prioritize-Economy-Over-Terrorism.aspx (indicating that 56% of Americans 
favored a candidate whose greatest strength was fixing the economy versus 39% who favored a 
candidate whose greatest strength was protecting the country from terrorism).  In 2002, by contrast, 
American policy towards Iraq was more important to voters than the economy.  See, e.g., GEORGE 
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 2002, at 337 (2003) (citing a Gallup poll from 
October 2002 indicating that the public at large was slightly more concerned with the economy than 
the war, but that those “most likely to vote” ranked the Iraq war as their higher priority by a margin 
of 47% to 39%). 
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war electorates of 2006 and 2008.20  Thus, the members elected to the House 
and Senate in 2008—and President Obama—represent a different set of pas-
sions and priorities than those members of the House and Senate elected in 
2002. 
In addition to the timing of elections, the three different elected parts of 
the American federal government represent different political constituencies.  
The President of the United States is elected by the entire nation.21  The 
Senate of the United States was elected historically by state legislatures22 and 
is now elected by the voters of states.23  The House of Representatives is 
elected by districts in particular states.24  Different political constituencies 
will elect political officials of different political factions, and with different 
political opinions.  The voters from rural Alabama might prefer a different 
type of politician to represent them in the House than do the voters from New 
York City, and the voters from northern Alabama might prefer a different 
president or different member of the Senate than the entire state of Alabama 
put together. 
This diversity in the politics of elected officials is only increased by the 
separation of functions created by the Constitution.  The Constitution creates 
a “classification of governmental power into three categories [and] 
allocat[es] . . . authority to three different institutions” to exercise those 
different powers.25  The Constitution identifies and allocates legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers, and assigns them largely to the Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial Branches, with some powers being exercised by 
more than one branch of government.26  This recognition of different forms 
 
20. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., COUNTRY IS “LOSING GROUND” ON DEFICIT, RICH-POOR GAP: 
WAR SUPPORT SLIPS, FEWER EXPECT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME 1 (2007), http://people-
press.org/reports/pdf/304.pdf (indicating that 55% of those polled in August 2006 said that the war 
in Iraq was “not going well” and 46% favored bringing soldiers home); PEW RESEARCH CTR., EVEN 
AS OPTIMISM ABOUT IRAQ SURGES, DECLINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT 1 
(2008), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/453.pdf (indicating that 43% of those polled thought that 
going to war was the right decision and 50% supported bringing the soldiers home); PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., MIDTERM ELECTION PREVIEW: AMERICANS THINKING ABOUT IRAQ, BUT 
FOCUSED ON THE ECONOMY 3 (2002), http://www.cfr.org/ (search “Midterm Election Preview”; 
then follow “Acrobat Distiller, Job 26” hyperlink) (“Roughly six-in-ten (62%) currently favor 
military action against Iraq.”). 
21. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”); id. amend. XII (“The Electors shall . . . vote by 
ballot for President . . . .”). 
22. Id. art. I, § 3. 
23. Id. amend. XVII. 
24. See id. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers.”). 
25. M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1127, 1132 (2000). 
26. See id. (“[T]he Constitution contains celebrated departures from pure separation, usually 
dubbed checks and balances: the Senate’s advise-and-consent functions, thought to be executive in 
nature; Congress’s involvement in the judicial function of impeachment; and the President’s power 
to approve or veto legislation, involving him in the legislative function.”). 
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of governmental authority—and allocation of most of those forms of author-
ity to one branch of government or another—permits voters to identify 
particular parties or ideologies that they feel are better suited for one branch 
of government or another.  While voters might feel that Democratic Senator 
Edward Kennedy or former Texas Republican Representative Tom DeLay 
can be trusted with the legislative power, they might not want either to be the 
Commander in Chief of the country.27  This is why governors have done so 
well in presidential elections: voters often choose a candidate with state ex-
ecutive experience to assume a federal executive position.28 
In other words, while it is not guaranteed, it is often the case that a 
range of ideologies are represented in the different branches of the federal 
government.  The range of rules that dictate who is elected to office and what 
they do once elected to office substantially increases the possibility that there 
will be partisan and ideological heterogeneity in the American federal 
government—when viewed from the perspective among the federal branches 
of government. 
B. Internal Homogeneity 
1. American Internal Homogeneity.—By contrast, while a comparison 
of the branches of government at any given time is likely to indicate 
substantial partisan (and therefore ideological) heterogeneity, a comparison 
of the various essential officials in the Executive Branch reveals substantial 
partisan and ideological homogeneity.  Simply put, while the Democratic and 
Republican parties alternate control of the Executive Branch, at any given 
time all of the top officials in the Executive Branch are Democrats, and 
Democrats of a very similar sort—or all of the top officials are Republicans, 
and Republicans of a very similar sort.29  There have not, to the best of my 
 
27. This ability to identify which politician would be better at particular governmental functions 
is furthered by the Constitution’s decision to prohibit any Executive Branch officials from serving 
in the Legislature, and vice versa—therefore prohibiting them from exercising multiple forms of 
authority beyond those overlapping powers provided by the Constitution.  See Steven G. Calabresi 
& Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel, 79 
CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1062–65 (1994) (specifying the limitations the Incompatibility Clause 
imposes on government officials).  This interpretation of the Constitution has recently been 
criticized by Seth Barrett Tillman.  Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or 
Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1 (2008), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/DJCLPP/index.php?action=down 
loadarticle&id=79. 
28. See, e.g., Pete DuPont, Can Kerry Execute?, WSJ.COM, Aug. 12, 2004, http://www.opinion 
journal.com/columnists/pdupont/?id=110005433 (“Among the 20th-century presidents, five of those 
with executive experience—Teddy Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ike, Ronald Reagan and 
Woodrow Wilson—ranked as great or near great. . . .  Which leads to the conclusion that America is 
usually better off with a president who has had executive experience before reaching the White 
House.”). 
29. My purpose here is not to highlight or critique the alleged normative virtues or vices of this 
uniformity.  Much of this normative territory is covered by articles that are part of the recent revival 
of interest in what Neal Katyal has called the normatively beneficial regime of “internal separation 
2009] The Second American Revolution  1415 
 
knowledge, been any studies of the precise number of cross-party, high-level 
Executive Branch officers over the course of American history, but we can 
safely say it is quite rare, for the reasons discussed below. 
One of the primary reasons for the internally homogeneous American 
executive is the central role that a single figure, the President, plays in 
defining the key personnel of the Executive Branch, a situation I have 
described elsewhere.30  The Constitution guarantees the President the author-
ity to appoint—subject to senatorial advice and consent—the “principal 
officers of the United States.”31  This means that a singular official is guaran-
teed by the Constitution the right to appoint—and potentially the right to 
remove—the major officials of the Executive Branch.  Even beyond these 
particularly high-level appointments, the President appoints, by some counts, 
as many as 8,000 of the other top Executive Branch officials.32  This creates a 
system in which one person—the President—selects essentially almost all of 
the top Executive Branch officials.  Unsurprisingly, then, the top officials in 
a presidential administration reflect the party and the outlook of a singular 
official, the President.33 
There are, of course, constraints on the President’s ability to appoint a 
homogeneous Executive Branch.  For one thing, the President cannot person-
ally make all 8,000 of these political appointments and so must essentially 
delegate a large number of these appointments to other individuals—
presenting a classic principal–agent problem, and leading to perhaps a less 
homogeneous Executive Branch than would exist if the President had to 
appoint these officials himself.  Still, though, over time the President has 
 
of powers.”  See Katyal, supra note 12, at 2316 (discussing the virtues of “executive v. executive” 
disputes and checks and balances).  William Marshall has highlighted the role of internal separation 
of powers in state constitutions.  William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?  Governors, State 
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 (2006).  
Katyal’s and Marshall’s normative considerations regarding the internal separation of powers might 
equally apply to the internal separation of perspectives.  Many of the benefits—and detriments—of 
dividing up powers between different executive actors might also apply to ensuring that these actors 
have a range of partisan and ideological perspectives. 
30. David Fontana, The Permanent and Presidential Transition Models of Defining Political 
Party Policy Leadership, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 398–404 (2009). 
31. See Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“The President has the sole responsibility for nominating [principal 
officers] . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have Power . . . [to] 
nominate, . . . by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, . . . Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United 
States . . . .”). 
32. See, e.g., Lois Romano, In Any Guise, Podesta a Smooth Master of the Transition Game, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2008, at C1 (noting that President Obama will likely oversee over 8,000 
appointments). 
33. See Anthony Bertelli & Sven E. Feldmann, Strategic Appointments, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. 
& THEORY 19, 22 (2007) (noting that Presidents typically appoint ideological analogues to lead 
executive agencies); Nolan McCarty & Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to 
Executive Branch Nominations 1885–1996, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122, 1122 (1999) (stating that 
Presidents typically appoint ideologically compatible party loyalists to pivotal positions). 
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centralized this appointments process in the White House Personnel Office 
and other individuals that the President deputizes to identify desirable politi-
cal appointees.34  Presidents also sometimes face congressionally created 
limitations on their power to appoint35 or to remove36 high-ranking executive 
officials. 
The President must answer to various political interests in making his 
appointments, and these political interests can disagree with one another and 
favor a broad range of officials for top Executive Branch positions—
particularly in a system like the United States where the political party that 
the President comes from is large, federal, and diverse.37  The interest groups 
that the President will pay attention to, though, will obviously skew heavily 
in favor of interest groups that share his party and his ideology.38  Both 
political parties are themselves becoming more ideologically coherent and 
homogeneous,39 so over time that inevitably means the President has faced 
demands to appoint individuals who much more rarely disagree with the 
President on major issues. 
That explains the demand side.  On the supply side, those qualified to 
fill high-level executive positions are homogeneous as well, particularly re-
cently because of the attitudinal polarization of the American elite in 
general40 and a series of factors (such as the creation of political primaries 
and more polarized electoral districts) that have polarized those elected to 
state and federal office in particular.41 
This is why the story of the Vice President becomes so important.  The 
Vice President is one of only two (at least potentially) Executive Branch 
 
34. See THOMAS J. WEKO, THE POLITICIZING PRESIDENCY: THE WHITE HOUSE PERSONNEL 
OFFICE 1948–1994, at 11 (1995) (detailing the centralization of appointments with the advent of the 
White House Personnel Office and emphasizing the importance of political appointments). 
35. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000) (“The President shall appoint in the Department of Justice, 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist 
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”). 
36. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1992) (stating that members of the Federal Reserve Board can 
only be removed for “cause”). 
37. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 277 (2000) (stating that American parties are highly decentralized 
collections of state and local organizations unified under a common interest in the national 
elections, with broad positions flexible enough for enormous disagreement). 
38. See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, Interest-Group Conservatism, SLATE, May 4, 2005, http://www. 
slate.com/id/2118053/ (noting the influence of liberal interest groups during Democratic 
presidencies and conservative interest groups during Republican presidencies). 
39. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2312, 2311–12 
(2001) (claiming that the political middle has “fallen out” of Congress due to party polarization). 
40. See MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  
THE MYTH OF A DIVIDED AMERICA 77 (2004) (arguing that the American political elite has 
polarized but that this does not reflect similar polarization among the electorate). 
41. See Mark Tushnet, Forward: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of 
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29, 42–46 (1999) (discussing the effects of primaries 
and ideologically homogeneous districts in influencing the partisan divide). 
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officials42 clearly mentioned in the Constitution.  With time, the Vice 
President has come to exercise substantial powers,43 and the Vice President 
has become first in line to run in later elections for President.44  In other 
words, perhaps as a formal matter, but certainly as a practical matter, the 
Vice President is an important part of the Executive Branch.  If the Vice 
President was of a different party than the President, that would substantially 
further the diversity of the Executive Branch.  Indeed, not only would there 
be a powerful member of the Executive Branch with a different perspective, 
but since the Vice President often has a role in empowering other powerful 
members of the Executive Branch,45 that diversity could extend beyond sim-
ply the person of the Vice President.  Even if the President were from a 
different political party than the Vice President, the inherent prominence of 
the Vice President—particularly in recent history—means that a Vice 
President from a different party than the President would have certain 
substantial executive powers. 
2. The Exceptionalism of American Internal Homogeneity.—The degree 
of homogeneity among top-level executive officials is high by almost any 
comparative measure.  The American state executive features many other 
directly elected officials besides simply the governor.  Forty-three of the fifty 
states feature independently elected state attorneys general, which sometimes 
results in an attorney general of one party and a governor of another party.46  
A similar structure exists in the constitutions of other countries, known as 
“semi-presidentialism.”  In semi-presidential systems, rather than there being 
more than one directly elected executive official, there is a single directly 
elected executive official and then another executive official appointed by 
the directly elected legislature.47 
 
42. There is, of course, some question about whether the Vice President is an executive official 
in the first place.  Former Vice President Richard Cheney argued that the Vice President was part of 
the Legislative Branch.  Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1.  Thomas Jefferson made a similar point hundreds of years ago.  See 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 283, 284 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (“I consider my office as constitutionally 
confined to legislative functions . . . .”). 
43. See generally JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE-PRESIDENCY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 134–202 (1982) (discussing the ways in which the 
American Vice President has become more powerful over time). 
44. Id. at 249–71. 
45. See Dana Milbank, In Cheney’s Shadow, Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A21 (describing the prominent role of David Addington, Cheney’s top 
lawyer and aid, in pushing for increased executive power). 
46. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 268 tbl.4.19 (37th ed. 2005) 
(listing the state attorneys general and the method by which each was selected). 
47. See Cindy Skach, The “Newest” Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 93, 96 (2007) (describing semi-presidential systems as those in which “a popularly 
elected president with a fixed term of office” coexists with  “a prime minister who is subject to a 
vote of no confidence in parliament”). 
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American states and countries with semi-presidential systems create the 
potential48 for a heterogeneous high-level executive by providing for directly 
or indirectly elected additional members of the executive branch.  In  parlia-
mentary systems, in which the executive is the legislature—and therefore is 
the winner of the election—the executive is often internally diverse because 
the executive is composed of a coalition of several different political parties.  
In many countries, several parties join together before an election,49 and most 
of the time in most of the major European democracies, the executive branch 
is composed of members of more than one party.50 Consider, similarly, the 
situation before the recent elections in Israel, in which one of the far-right 
leaders, Avigdor Lieberman, was a Deputy Prime Minister,51 and one of the 
more far-left leaders, Ehud Barak, was the Defense Minister.52 
In presidential systems, it is often the case that the vice president is 
nominated by the president and so can be closely affiliated with the 
president,53 and this has become the informal norm recently in the 
presidential system of the United States.54  Even then, though, in other coun-
tries it can be the case that the vice president comes from another political 
party and so is more likely to disagree with the president.  In Argentina, for 
instance, Vice President Carlos Alvarez resigned in 2000 because of dis-
agreements with President Fernando de la Rua over fighting corruption,55 and 
just last year Vice President Julio Cobos voted against President Cristina 
 
48. A state attorney general and governor could be of the same political party and political 
persuasion; likewise, the president and prime minister in a semi-presidential system could have the 
same political profile.  But the American internal executive homogeneity is essentially permanent 
and constant; the potential for executive heterogeneity created by state constitutions and semi-
presidential constitutions means those constitutions create temporary executive heterogeneity rather 
than permanent executive heterogeneity. 
49. See James E. Alt & David Dreyer Lassen, Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and Debt 
in OECD Countries, 50 EUR. ECON. REV. 1403, 1425 n.34, available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ 
eecrev/v50y2006i6p1403-1439.html (“In those countries with the most frequent coalition 
governments, 46 per cent of elections from 1980–2000 feature pre-electoral pacts among parties 
receiving significant votes.”). 
50. Wolfgang C. Müller & Kaare Strøm, Introduction to COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 1, 2–3 (Wolfgang C. Müller & Kaare Strøm eds., 2003). 
51. Rory McCarthy, Hardliner Avigdor Lieberman Set to Become Israel’s Foreign Minister, 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2009, at 23. 
52. New Israel Defence Minister Named, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/middle_east/6757305.stm. 
53. See, e.g., CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 77, para. 1 (Braz.), translated in 3 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2009) 
(“[E]lection of the President of the Republic includes election of the Vice President registered with 
him.”); id. art. 79, para. 1 (“[T]he Vice President of the Republic . . . assist[s] the President 
whenever called by the President for special missions.”). 
54. Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 874 (2005). 
55. Clifford Krauss, Argentine President Is Trying to Keep Coalition Together, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 9, 2000, at A4. 
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Fernández de Kirchner’s politically controversial attempt to raise taxes on 
farm exports.56 
In addition, in American state constitutions and constitutions of other 
countries of all forms—parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential—
executive branches are made heterogeneous by the presence of more civil-
service, nonpolitical figures exercising high-level executive powers.  
Sometimes these civil-service figures are “heads of state,” who are separate 
from “heads of government” and exercise substantial powers.57  Sometimes 
they are civil-service executive officials of a more bureaucratic temperament 
who, because their promotion stands apart from the vagaries of electoral 
politics, might be more likely to represent a range of perspectives—and as 
mentioned before, the American Executive Branch is distinctive in the low 
number of such officials that it possesses.58 
III. The First Founding Moment for the Separation of Powers 
What explains this difference in the structure of the American Executive 
Branch?  The last two Parts of this Article will focus on historical and insti-
tutional explanations—although there are surely explanations that are 
cultural or political.  This Part will discuss how, at the time of the creation of 
the Constitution, there was at worst ambivalence, and at best approval, for 
the idea of a diverse high-level executive.  The main change in executive 
structure that was a source of discussion at the time of the creation of the 
Constitution was not how diverse high-level executive officials would be, but 
rather whether the Executive would be a collegial, horizontal Executive—
composed of multiple members of roughly equal power—or a hierarchical 
Executive, also composed of multiple members, but multiple members not of 
equal power.  This orientation persisted, even immediately before and during 
the debate leading to the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment.  But, as a 
result of the Twelfth Amendment, and its interactions with the legal and po-
litical fabric at the time and thereafter, the American federal Executive 
became both hierarchical and homogeneous. 
A. From the Horizontal to the Hierarchical Executive 
Scholars writing about the creation of the American presidency at the 
Constitutional Convention have generally agreed that earlier failures of 
 
56. Alexei Barrionuevo, Vote Creates Unlikely Foe for Leader of Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2008, at A6. 
57. Indeed, as one article discusses, the range of prominent powers held by presidents can 
include “the president’s exclusive discretion to dissolve parliament (Italy), the requirement of 
countersignatures of cabinet decrees (Italy), suspensory veto over legislation (Czech Republic, 
Slovakia), the power to decree new laws (Greece for some time after 1975), and appointments to 
high offices, sometimes (as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia) including ministries.”  Scott 
Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical 
Appraisal, 29 COMP. POL. 449, 451 (1997). 
58. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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executive power in state constitutions and under the Articles of 
Confederation meant that the founders wanted to create an executive stronger 
than the one that existed under the Articles of Confederation regime.59  But 
while this preference for a stronger executive might have meant a preference 
for an executive with broad appointment and removal powers (a subject of 
much scholarly debate),60 it is a different question altogether whether, as part 
of that preference for a stronger executive, the founders also preferred a ho-
mogeneous executive.  In fact, the founding generation seemed to welcome a 
diverse executive, but one of a different structure than the diverse executives 
that preceded the creation of the new federal Constitution. 
An executive branch composed of more than one person could be 
structured in one of two ways.  First, the executive branch could feature a 
“horizontal executive,” in which the multiple members of the executive 
branch are roughly equal or at least concurrent in exercising powers granted 
to them.  Second, the executive branch could feature a “hierarchical 
executive,” in which there are other members of the executive branch, but 
there is a singular figure that rules over the other members of the executive 
branch.  The switch in the form of the executive in 1787 was from horizontal 
to hierarchical, but even a hierarchical executive was meant to create the po-
tential for heterogeneity among high-level executive officers. 
The state constitutions that predated and in many ways informed the 
1787 federal Constitution largely featured horizontal executives.61  In many 
state constitutions, there was a separate and independent governor, but the 
governor had to obtain the approval of an executive council of some sort to 
 
59. See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 30–39 (2008) (noting the historical accounts 
of the long-standing preference for strong executive power by Gordon Wood and Charles Thach).  
This Article is not meant to agree or disagree with arguments made by those like Calabresi and Yoo 
in favor of a unitary executive.  I am not making an argument about the historical understanding of 
the President over other Executive Branch officials; I am merely discussing historical 
understandings about the range and diversity of those in the Executive Branch, not their relative 
power compared to one another.  Also not making an argument about the relative power of the 
Executive Branch, Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar state: 
We use the term “unitary” executive to refer only to a White House in which the 
President and Vice President are of the same party.  The term has a different meaning 
in cases and literature addressing the extent to which separation of powers principles 
give the President countermand or removal power over individuals and agencies who 
are located in the executive branch or who are exercising executive power . . . . 
Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 923 n.43 (1992). 
60. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist 
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1271–72 (2006) (arguing that textual evidence 
suggests that the framers did not intend for the President to have such broad powers). 
61. See, e.g., Michael Sevi, Original Intent, Timetables, and Iraq: The Founders’ Views on War 
Powers, 13 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 73, 80 (2008) (finding that seven of eight states that adopted new 
constitutions between 1776 and 1787 included provisions for reducing executive power, including, 
inter alia, “destroying the unity of the executive office and instituting an executive council, which 
made the governor more a chairman of the board than a singular leader”). 
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take action on important matters.62  All of the state constitutions in effect in 
1787, with the exception of New Hampshire and New York, featured a state 
executive council whose task it was to “advise the Governor in the execution 
of his office.”63  These councils were not as powerful as the governors’ 
councils of the colonial period;64 but in all the state constitutions that 
provided for councils, gubernatorial activities required their approval for 
major actions.65  With other horizontal executives in state constitutions, there 
was no singular governor; instead, the office of the governor was itself a 
multimember body, rather than the multimember body external to and ad-
vising the office of governor.  The influential 1776 constitution from 
Pennsylvania, for instance, had a twelve-member executive, and all twelve 
members were elected separately.66  Likewise, the Federal Articles of 
Confederation did not feature an executive branch.67  Instead, it featured a 
rather extreme example of a horizontal executive, with several thousand 
(formally equal) legislative committees administering the executive power of 
the federal government.68 
The failure of these horizontal executives was keenly on the minds of 
the founders when they met in Philadelphia to draft the language for the new 
federal Executive.69  But their response was not to abolish a heterogeneous 
 
62. See, e.g., WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 265 
(Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., expanded ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001) 
(1973) (discussing provisions of South Carolina’s constitution of 1776 requiring council approval of 
certain executive decisions); MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE 
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 120 (1997) (discussing provisions of an 
early version of the constitution of Maryland requiring the governor to obtain the approval of an 
executive council). 
63. See 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 2791 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) 
(quoting language from the North Carolina constitution as representative of state constitutional 
treatment of these councils). 
64. ADAMS, supra note 62, at 272–73. 
65. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 59, at 31 (“The majority of these state constitutions 
required governors to obtain the consent of a council of state chosen by the legislature before taking 
any major executive action.”). 
66. PA. CONST. § 19 (1776) (repealed 1790); see also J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA 
CONSTITUTION OF 1776, at 194–95 (1971) (discussing the plural executive created by 
Pennsylvania’s 1776 constitution and its provisions for separate and staggered elections for 
councilors). 
67. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. X (describing the executive powers of the “committee 
of the States”); see also PAUL CHRISTOPHER MANUEL & ANNE MARIE CAMMISA, CHECKS & 
BALANCES? 60 (1999) (remarking that the Articles of Confederation did not have a separate 
executive branch). 
68. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 5 (stating that Congress has the power to appoint a 
“Committee of the States” and “such other committees . . . as may be necessary for managing the 
general affairs of the United States”). 
69. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 59, at 30 (noting the framers’ “disdain for the 
weak executive branches created for the federal government by the Articles of Confederation and 
for the states by the post-1776 state constitutions”). 
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Executive Branch; it was simply to create a hierarchical Executive Branch 
with a clearer line of authority between the chief executive and the other 
Executive Branch officials.  The founding Constitution meant to create more 
than one member of the Executive Branch.  Some Executive Branch cabinet 
members of some sort were clearly anticipated.70  The Vice President of the 
United States, in addition to breaking ties in the Senate71 and counting elec-
toral votes for President,72 would also exercise executive power if he 
succeeded to the presidency, as anticipated if there were problems with the 
President of the United States under the 1787 Constitution.73 
In fact, there were many constitutional rules in place at the time that 
even seemed to encourage a result in which one of the multiple members of 
the Executive Branch would have a different political orientation than the 
chief executive.  It was around this time that states began to create independ-
ent attorneys general,74 with Rhode Island providing for the popular election 
of their attorney general.75  States revising their constitutions after 1787—or 
new states drafting their first constitutions—included provisions for sepa-
rately elected executive officials,76 with these officials being subordinate to a 
Governor. 
The rules regarding the Vice President in the original Constitution were 
also consequential, because they seemed to invite a heterogeneous Executive 
Branch.  Even though the Constitution did not formally identify the Vice 
President as an Executive Branch official, early vice presidents participated 
in the activities of the Executive Branch.  For example, early vice presidents 
participated in cabinet meetings,77 and the first Vice President was a 
prominent politician, John Adams.  It is true that sometimes vice presidents 
 
70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in writing, of the 
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of 
their respective Offices.”). 
71. See id. art. I, § 3 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, 
but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”). 
72. See id. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their 
respective States . . . .  And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of 
Votes for each . . . .  The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.”). 
73. See id. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (“In Case of the Removal of the 
President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties 
of the said Office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President . . . .”). 
74. See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2451, 2450–51 (noting that the office of attorney general 
existed in all thirteen states at the time of the founding and that “[a]s the nation matured, many 
states created independent attorneys general and afforded the Office even greater autonomy by 
making it a popularly elected position”). 
75. See Office of the Attorney General, http://www.state.ri.us/govtracker/index.php?page= 
DetailDeptAgency&eid=3877 (reporting that the office has been an elected position since its 
creation in 1650). 
76. See Marshall, supra note 29, at 2451 (citing Ohio’s first constitution as an example of a 
state dispersing the executive power over several independent officers). 
77. Charles O. Paullin, The Vice President and the Cabinet, 29 AM. HIST. REV. 496, 496–500 
(1924) (discussing the history of the vice-presidential role in cabinet meetings). 
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would be less powerful,78 but sometimes vice presidents would be quite 
powerful. 
The rules regarding the selection of the Vice President made it highly 
possible that the Vice President, exercising at least some degree of executive 
influence some of the time, would be from a different political faction than 
the President.  The Vice President was not required to win any election, but 
only to finish second in the balloting for President.79  Indeed, this might have 
been the first “proportional representation” rule in the United States, since it 
substantially increased the chances of a losing political party obtaining a po-
sition in the government by granting the vice presidency to the person who 
received the second most votes for the presidency, rather than the most votes 
for that office—which is why the minority political party at the time of the 
debate over the Twelfth Amendment opposed changing this rule.80 
Given an Executive Branch of more than one person and an Executive 
Branch that was structured to permit if not even encourage internal diversity, 
how can the repudiation in Philadelphia of the state collegial executive of the 
pre-1787 period be explained?  There was certainly still some support for a 
horizontal executive in Philadelphia.81  The Virginia Plan included an execu-
tive council, similar to the model used in state constitutions, which had the 
executive power to veto laws,82 and the New Jersey Plan contemplated a 
horizontal executive as well.83  Eventually, though, a motion to have a single 
executive passed the Committee on Detail.84 
 
78. An example from around the time of the Twelfth Amendment serves to prove this point.  
Aaron Burr, serving as Vice President during President Thomas Jefferson’s time in office, was 
widely ignored, and in retaliation Burr once cast a tie-breaking vote as President of the Senate 
against Jefferson’s wishes.  See JULES WITCOVER, CRAPSHOOT: ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE 
PRESIDENCY 22 (1992). 
79. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (“The Electors 
shall . . . vote by Ballot for two persons . . . .  The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall 
be the President . . . .  [A]fter the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of 
Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President.”). 
80. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 178 (1803) (statement of Sen. Tracy) (“[T]he ruling party of the day, 
ha[s] brought forward this amendment, for the purpose of preventing the choice of a Federal Vice 
President at the next election.”); see also ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 204 (“By requiring the 
electors to vote separately for the two offices, they would prevent the Federalists from slipping their 
man into second place.”). 
81. Statements in support of a plural executive were made by several members of the 
Committee on Detail debating the matter.  FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 31–32, 33 & n.3 
(Richard J. Ellis ed., 1999). 
82. See JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 25 (Gaillard 
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford University Press 1920) (1893) (“[T]he Executive and a 
convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority 
to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular 
Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall 
amount to a rejection.”). 
83. See FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 81, at 33 (“The New Jersey Plan 
left unspecified the number of persons who would make up the federal executive, but it clearly 
anticipated that it would be more than one person.”). 
84. See id. at 37 (stating that a one-person executive resulted from the vote). 
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But the change in thinking at the time of the federal founding was not 
from an embrace to a rejection of a diverse Executive Branch.  Instead, it was 
from an embrace of the horizontal executive to a rejection of it and an em-
brace of a hierarchical executive.  The chief concern in Philadelphia about 
the Executive Branch was not its internal diversity, but its impotence because 
of its horizontal structure.85  As a result, the Constitution creates a clear 
leader of the Executive Branch: “A President of the United States of 
America.”86 
Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that a diverse Executive 
Branch was still embraced even after the creation of the singular office of the 
President of the United States.  The first President after the Constitution 
came into effect, George Washington, asked the ideologically opposed 
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson both to be in his cabinet.87  This 
heterogeneous Executive continued into the Adams Administration.  
Republican Thomas Jefferson was elected Vice President, to serve under the 
Federalist President John Adams.88  Adams tried to convince Jefferson to 
travel to Paris to negotiate with France, the key foreign policy issue of the 
time; and when Jefferson declined, Adams considered another Republican, 
James Madison.89 
Part of this seemingly heterogeneous Executive at the time had much to 
do with the idea that politics was not meant to include parties, factions, and 
ideology, but was simply a process of notables called to serve.90  But by 
1796, if not before, the notion that there were no partisan or ideological 
factions was not a realistic view of the world.91  And by the end of the 
Adams Administration, party voting levels were “extremely high . . . , well 
 
85. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 59, at 30 (discussing how the framers’ disdain for the 
weak executive branch in the Articles of Confederation led them to the theory of the unitary 
executive). 
86. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added). 
87. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14, at 19  (“Washington . . . included both Hamilton and 
Jefferson in his first cabinet, and desperately sought to keep these great rivals in harness.  But it was 
not to be.  By the end of his first administration, Jefferson and Hamilton were already locked in 
bitter conflict.”). 
88. See JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 332 (1992) (reviewing the results of the election, 
in which Adams received seventy-one votes to Jefferson’s sixty-eight). 
89. See id. at 341 (recounting Adams’s attempts to include the two Republicans in the envoy to 
Paris). 
90. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(“[A]mong the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed union, none deserves to be 
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”); John F. 
Hoadley, The Emergence of Political Parties in Congress, 1789–1803, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 757, 
778 (1980) (“[W]hen the new government was created by the Constitution, most political leaders 
shared a strong anti-party tradition.  Parties were perceived as agencies which would hinder the 
progress of good government . . . .”). 
91. See, e.g., DAVID BRION DAVIS & STEVEN MINTZ, THE BOISTEROUS SEA OF LIBERTY 259–
60 (1998) (noting that despite a belief that parties were evil, divisions among national leaders 
emerged as early as 1791 and the first political party evolved in 1794). 
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above levels . . . in modern times.”92  Yet still, during the 1790s there were 
cabinets composed of a range of officials, and from 1797 to 1801 a President 
and Vice President from diametrically opposed political parties. 
The creation of the Federal Constitution in 1787, then, was not meant as 
an impediment to the reality of a heterogeneous corps of elite executive 
officials.  The repudiation of the weaker, more horizontal Executive Branch 
of pre-1787 was meant to be replaced by a stronger, more hierarchical 
Executive Branch, but one that featured a degree of diversity.  The hetero-
geneous nature of the American Executive during its earlier years—both 
before and after the advent of parties and partisanship—was the practical 
result of this.  It was up to the second founding to change that. 
IV. The Second Founding Moment for the Separation of Powers 
The constitutional settlement of 1787 had substantial implications for 
the division of power between the three branches of the federal government.  
But many issues were not resolved by the text of 1787, the Bill of Rights that 
followed it, or the decade of constitutional practice after that.  It took the 
“revolution of 1800”93 and the constitutional changes that followed to further 
shape the new American separation-of-powers regime.  For it was the 
Twelfth Amendment, and the legal and political context in the years to come, 
that eradicated the diverse high-level Executive Branch. 
A. An Alteration in Constitutional Form 
The primary concern of those drafting the Twelfth Amendment was not 
the elimination of a heterogeneous Executive Branch; it was the issue of 
“designation,” making sure that a political official holds the office that the 
electors selected them for, not another office.94  No less a figure than 
Gouverneur Morris wrote that the major problem with the mode of federal 
elections before the Twelfth Amendment was the possibility that “at some 
time or other a person admirably fitted for the office of President might have 
an equal vote with one totally unqualified, and that, by the predominance of 
faction in the House of Representatives, the latter might be preferred.”95  No 
version of the Amendment included language prohibiting another Adams–
Jefferson Administration, or something else like it; and earlier versions of the 
 
92. JOHN F. HOADLEY, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES 1789–1803, at 144 (1986). 
93. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 212, 212 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904) (“The 
revolution of 1800 . . . was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 
was in its form; not effected indeed by the sword, as that, but by the rational and peaceable 
instrument of reform, the suffrage of the people.”). 
94. See Lolabel House, A Study of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States 42 (1901) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (recapping the 
legislative genesis of the Amendment’s requirement that votes be designated for a specific office). 
95. DAVID K. WATSON, 2 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY, 
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 1557 (1910). 
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Amendment simply made sure to resolve this designation issue.96  Many of 
those responsible for the Twelfth Amendment, then, “saw the loss of [the 
chances of a diverse executive] as a cost to be borne in order to remedy the 
inversion problem, rather than a benefit to be obtained as a result of the new 
amendment.”97 
Indeed, the spirit of the heterogeneous executive persisted in American 
constitutional life.  As William Marshall has noted, “as the nineteenth cen-
tury unfurled, most new states provided in their constitutions for the popular 
election of an attorney general (and other executive branch officials) while 
many of the established states amended their constitutions to the same end.”98  
The text of the Constitution itself is clear that the Vice President is to be 
elected separately from the President,99 which certainly leaves open the 
possibility of a Vice President from one party and a President from another 
party.  If the electoral votes do not settle the election, then certainly the 
House of Representatives is free to vote for a President from one party100 at 
the same time that the Senate votes for a Vice President of a different 
party.101  Many voted against the Twelfth Amendment because they felt it 
would be much more unlikely to have a President of one party and a Vice 
President of another party after the Twelfth Amendment became part of the 
Constitution,102 and this is why the Twelfth Amendment had to be introduced 
several times in Congress before it received the requisite two-thirds 
majority.103 
 
96. See House, supra note 94, at 42 (quoting an earlier version of the Amendment which stated 
“[t]hat in all future elections of President and Vice-President, the persons shall be particularly 
designated, by declaring which is voted for as President and which as Vice-President”). 
97. Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision—A Missed Chance to Straighten Out Some 
Muddled Issues, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 185, 204.  As Mike Seidman pointed out to me in 
commenting on a draft of this Article, even as they resolved the issue of designation, the drafters of 
the Twelfth Amendment could have made it more likely to have a President from one party and a 
Vice President from another party, because they could have created one set of electors to choose the 
President and one set of electors to choose the Vice President. 
98. Marshall, supra note 29, at 2452. 
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by 
ballot for President and Vice-president . . . and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for 
as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice president . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
100. Id. 
101. See House, supra note 94, at 51 (discussing how this scenario is possible if an election is 
decided by Congress). 
102. For instance, John Quincy Adams objected to the Twelfth Amendment because he felt it 
was “intend[ed] to prevent a federal Vice President from being chosen.”  NEAL R. PEIRCE & 
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICA AND 
THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 43 (1981) (quoting 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 128 (1803)). 
103. A similar proposal had been discussed in 1797 in both houses of Congress, 1798 in the 
Senate, 1799 in the House of Representatives, and was passed by the House of Representatives on 
May 1, 1802 but did not receive the requisite two-thirds majority.  Id. at 42.  Part—but not all—of 
the disagreement was from the Federalists, because all Federalists (except Alexander Hamilton) 
opposed the Twelfth Amendment.  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–1829, at 40 (2001). 
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B. A Revolution in Constitutional Reality 
Whatever the intentions of the Twelfth Amendment, the reality was 
stark: It became very difficult for there to be a Vice President from one party 
and a President from another party (Democratic Vice President Andrew 
Johnson serving with Republican President Abraham Lincoln functioning as 
a notable exception.)104  The Twelfth Amendment on its own terms did not 
do this.  This new reality, one present only after the Twelfth Amendment, 
was because of how the Twelfth Amendment interacted with a series of po-
litical and legal changes that were to follow.105 
Akhil Reed Amar and Vik Amar have argued that there were two 
reasons for this reality: no desire on the part of voters to split their ballot for 
President and Vice President, and no opportunity for them to do so because 
of state laws that prevented voters from voting for a President of one party 
and a Vice President of another party.106  One could add to the legal reasons 
why a split executive was not impossible the increasing reality of state laws 
(or strong norms) that prevented electors themselves from splitting their 
ballots, not just voters.107 But in some ways this is overstating the case.  
However true it is that “[t]icket-splitting was almost unheard of in the nine-
teenth century,”108 in close elections it would not have taken many electoral 
votes choosing one party’s candidate for President and the other party’s can-
didate for Vice President to make the vice-presidential candidate on the 
second-place presidential ticket have the most votes for Vice President. 
The reasons, then, are much deeper than Amar and Amar acknowledge.  
There is no doubt that the Twelfth Amendment, on its own terms, would 
make it harder to have a heterogeneous high-level Executive Branch.  Before 
the Twelfth Amendment became a part of the Constitution, finishing second 
was sufficient to become Vice President.  After the Twelfth Amendment, 
only a first-place finisher (for vice presidency) could become Vice President.  
For a Vice President to be from a party different than the President—and to 
 
104. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second 
Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 738 (2003) (recounting Lincoln’s decision to add 
Johnson to the ticket to appeal to Northern Democrats and border-state Unionists). 
105. In this way, then, the Article tells a story about constitutional change different from that 
told by David Strauss, who argues that constitutional amendments have proved to be largely 
irrelevant.  See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1457, 1459 (2001) (“[C]onstitutional amendments have not been an important means of 
changing the constitutional order.”).  In the case of the internal structure of the Executive Branch, 
the Twelfth Amendment—or perhaps more importantly, the Twelfth Amendment’s rules plus how 
those rules interacted with subsequent political and legal realities—did have significant 
consequences. 
106. Amar & Amar, supra note 59, at 925. 
107. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 
J.L. & POL. 665, 690 (1996) (“In the first 150 years of the nation’s history, assertions were made in 
judicial proceedings that electors must cast their ballots in accordance with the popular vote of their 
states.  These assertions relied on common law theories of contract or public officer duties.”). 
108. JAMES Q. WILSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 190 (1980). 
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finish first in a race for Vice President in the same election as a member of 
the opposing party finished first in an election for President—there had to be 
a candidate popular enough, on his own, to attract many votes. 
In reality, though, vice-presidential nominees became inconsequential 
figures that no one paid attention to in the first place.109  After luminaries like 
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson as Vice President, according to one 
writer, John Calhoun was “the only American statesman of the first or second 
rank who held the Vice-Presidency in the century between its occupancy by 
Jefferson and by Roosevelt.”110  There was no compelling figure drawing 
attention and worthy of attracting voters—or electors—to rally behind a Vice 
President from a different political party than the political party of the 
President.  And so even in those states that permitted voters or electors to 
split their ballots for President and Vice President, there was little desire to 
do so—and there was little desire to persuade the states that legally prevented 
split ballots to change their rules to accommodate a pervasive desire to vote 
for a President from one party and a Vice President of another party. 
Also, the Twelfth Amendment made it easier for powerful institutions 
like political parties to control who would run for Vice President—and also 
to ensure that candidates for Vice President shared the ideological views of 
the party and of the candidate for President.  As mentioned before, the issue 
of “designation”—of identifying who was running for what office—was at 
the core of the rationale for creating the Twelfth Amendment.111  And given 
the increasing power of formal political parties, there was no better institu-
tion to make it clear who was running for what office than the newly 
powerful political parties that emerged around the time of the Twelfth 
Amendment. 
With political parties controlling who would become the nominee for 
Vice President, it was increasingly difficult to have a vice-presidential nomi-
nee with a compelling—and separate—identity from the political party that 
nominated the Vice President and nominated the presidential candidate.112  
Since a Vice President needed to finish first after the creation of the Twelfth 
Amendment (in the election for Vice President), rather than second (as was 
the case before the Twelfth Amendment), the support of an institution like a 
 
109. See Albert, supra note 54, at 831–32 (cataloguing the slights upon the vice presidency 
from all manner of American statesmen). 
110. LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES 
71 (1934). 
111. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
112. See Amar & Amar, supra note 59, at 943, 943–44 (arguing that the system of tying 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates “seems more an inherited product of the nineteenth 
century’s political climate and the twentieth century’s inattention than a deliberate, self-conscious 
choice”). 
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political party became more important, and insurgent campaigns for Vice 
President therefore became even more difficult.113 
After the creation of the Twelfth Amendment, parties controlled the 
nomination of the Vice President, and “[p]residential nominees often were 
either unable or unwilling to dictate who would fill the second spot.”114  In 
the latter part of the twentieth century, presidential nominees gained greater 
ability to nominate a candidate of their own choosing, apart from the candi-
date the party preferred.  Still, a similar dynamic continued—rather than the 
party controlling the choice of the Vice President, the President did, so there 
was still an incentive towards conformity, but now with the President and not 
with the party of the President.  And just like parties before, now presidential 
candidates had little reason to pursue changes in state law that made it easier 
to split votes for President and Vice President.  The source of homogeneity 
had changed from the party to the President, but the reality and the result re-
mained the same. 
V. Conclusion 
At the time of its creation, there was no office in the world like the 
American President.  The moment that the possibility of a single executive 
official at the apex of the pyramid of the Executive Branch was mentioned, 
there was a silence in the room of the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia.115  Years later, while the idea of a single, powerful, elected 
chief executive has become more common, the homogeneity of the American 
Executive Branch has not.  The Executive Branch in Washington is domi-
nated by those from the same party and from the same wing of that party. 
If we want to know how this came to be, we can look back at history 
and see the unintended consequences of a constitutional amendment as partly 
responsible.  During the early years of the republic, the founders altered and 
modified executive power, and engaged in lengthy discussions about the na-
ture of the Executive Branch.  While they wanted a more powerful President, 
they also wanted a President surrounded by a range of cabinet and other 
officials—and this was still the case after the creation of the Twelfth 
Amendment.  Over the two-hundred years plus since the Twelfth 
Amendment, however, the reality has become something different, and the 
hurdles that the Twelfth Amendment created for a divided Executive have 
become nearly insurmountable. 
 
113. See House, supra note 94, at 50–51 (“The enormous consequence of [the Twelfth 
Amendment] has been to make party government constitutional.  It has made it imperative that the 
President and Vice-President be party representatives and practically impossible that they be chosen 
at the outset from different parties, unless the election devolves upon the House or Senate.”). 
114. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 43, at 47. 
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